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Abstract:Motivated by recent work of Bousso and Polchinski (BP), we study theories
which explain the small value of the cosmological constant using the anthropic princi-
ple. We argue that simultaneous solution of the gauge hierarchy problem is a strong
constraint on any such theory. We exhibit three classes of models which satisfy these
constraints. The first is a version of the BP model with precisely two large dimensions.
The second involves 6-branes and antibranes wrapped on supersymmetric 3-cycles of
Calabi-Yau manifolds, and the third is a version of the irrational axion model. All of
them have possible problems in explaining the size of microwave background fluctua-
tions. We also find that most models of this type predict that all constants in the low
energy Lagrangian, as well as the gauge groups and representation content, are chosen
from an ensemble and cannot be uniquely determined from the fundamental theory.
In our opinion, this significantly reduces the appeal of this kind of solution of the cos-
mological constant problem. On the other hand, we argue that the vacuum selection
problem of string theory might plausibly have an anthropic, cosmological solution.
Keywords: Cosmological Constant, Anthropic Principle.
∗On leave from Rutgers University.
†This work was done while visiting UCSC.
Contents
1. Introduction 1
2. A principled approach to the anthropic principle 4
3. Flux redux 8
4. Brane-antibrane separation 12
5. Rationalizing the Irrational Axion 14
6. The empty universe problem and the cosmic microwave background
(CMB) 15
7. Anthropic vacuum selection in M-theory 17
8. Conclusions 21
1. Introduction
In a recent paper [1], Bousso and Polchinski (BP) have revisited and improved some old
ideas for explaining the value of the cosmological constant. They focused on the mem-
brane creation scenario of Brown and Teitelboim [2, 3] and found what they claim to be
a consistent anthropic solution of the cosmological constant problem. They exhibited
models which potentially have a large number of discrete vacuum states, a small fraction
of which have a small cosmological constant. They then invoke Weinberg’s bound on
values of the cosmological constant consistent with galaxy formation [4] and/or recent
improvements on that bound [5]-[6] (see however [7]) to argue that only those states
with cosmological constant consistent with observation will have living organisms in
them to observe the value of the cosmological constant. Finally, they argue that their
models solve the empty universe problem encountered in several previous attempts to
find an anthropic resolution of the cosmological constant problem.
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The anthropic determination of the constants of nature is very controversial1. The
present paper may be read as a critique of anthropic arguments in general; it was di-
rectly inspired by the work of Bousso and Polchinski, which is, in our view, one of
the more successful efforts to date to give a framework for such an anthropic discus-
sion. We begin with a statement of principle about the anthropic principle, and argue
that within a certain context one might imagine a scientifically defensible anthropic
determination of the cosmological constant, but that with the current state of scientific
knowledge, it does not make sense to discuss anthropic arguments for other physical
parameters. Bousso and Polchinski proposed various scenarios to obtain a small cos-
mological constant. All require utilizing the strong version [5] of Weinberg’s galaxy
formation bound. In one, in which the compactification scale does not differ signifi-
cantly from the fundamental scale, we find that the gauge hierarchy problem of the
standard model is not resolved. Since, within our groundrules, one cannot explain this
fine tuning anthropically, the model fails to be a consistent theory of our universe, but
rather predicts that among those points in the BP discretuum which might contain
intelligent organisms, the typical point does not contain a low energy spontaneously
broken gauge theory.
In scenarios with d large compact dimensions, different issues arise. One cannot
consistently ignore the flux dependence of the potential for moduli. As a consequence,
if d 6= 2, cancellation of the cosmological constant still requires significant fine tuning.
For d = 2 [8], however, it appears possible, in principle, to cancel the cosmological
constant and to obtain a suitable hierarchy. This picture is much like that of the large
dimension picture of [8], where the logarithmic behavior of massless propagators in two
dimensions can give rise to hierarchies.
We have found another mechanism, which employs six-branes wrapped on CY
three-cycles, which does not require large internal dimensions and achieves results sim-
ilar to those of the two-dimensional BP models, in what appears to be a more generic
region of moduli space.
We then describe a rational version of the irrational axion model [9] which might be
derivable from string theory. This model can solve both the hierarchy problem (using
SUSY) and the cosmological constant problem (anthropically).
The empty universe problem often arises in discussions of solutions of the cosmo-
logical constant [10] [2]. We believe that this is an artifact of constructing one’s theory
out of noninteracting modules. In a realistic theory, the potential for any inflaton field
can have a dependence on the discrete vacuum labels. As a consequence, as long as the
1Weinberg has remarked that a physicist talking about the anthropic principle runs the same risk
as a cleric talking about pornography: no matter how much you say you’re against it, some people
will think you’re a little too interested.
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inflaton potential does not have a large flux independent piece, after the final tunneling
event, the inflaton begins its classical motion at a point far removed from its vacuum
value. It can thus reheat the universe in the standard manner2. However, in models
of inflation with only very small fine tuning of parameters, this proposal leads, as a
consequence of the low scale of the inflaton potential, to too small an amplitude for
density perturbations. Thus, all of the models which solve both the gauge hierarchy
and cosmological constant problems, either have an empty universe problem, or pre-
dict too small an amplitude for density perturbations, or require finely tuned models
of inflation.
We find this disturbing in the context of models based on a large discretuum,
because all of the low energy parameters are random variables. Indeed, there are
generically many solutions to the anthropic constraint on the cosmological constant,
all of which have very different low energy physics. Since we discount the possibility of
explaining the values of other parameters anthropically, we are left in an uncomfortable
situation if we find that generic models in the class do not give correct predictions for
low energy physics.
We should mention a very recent proposal to solve the cosmological constant prob-
lem using four-form fluxes which invokes, at most, much more mild applications of
the anthropic principle. This idea involves tunneling through a large set of metastable
states, a tunneling which finally ends when the cosmological constant is very small. If
successfully realized, such a proposal would not suffer from many of the problems to
be discussed here[11] (though some of the cosmological difficulties might persist). We
will not explore this proposal here.
Finally, we propose a rather different, and much more modest, application of an-
thropic arguments. We imagine that generic SUSY violating vacua of M-theory are
unstable and/or do not lead to any sort of large spacetime. There might be only a
few special points which are dynamically stable once SUSY is violated. Even if one of
them resembles our world, we must still understand why Nature did not choose one of
the stable SUSY vacuum states. We suggest that anthropic arguments may provide
part of the answer to this question, and give a broadbrush description of how such an
argument might work.
As we were completing this paper, the paper [12] appeared, which has some overlap
with our considerations.
2The idea that the excitation of an inflaton away from its vacuum value could be a consequence of
tunneling, was first employed in [13]-[14].
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2. A principled approach to the anthropic principle
In our opinion, at the present time, any scientifically defensible use of the anthropic
principle must conform to the following two guidelines:
• It must be embedded in an explicit mathematical model which truly has an
enormous number of ground states, including some with the observed values of
low energy coupling constants.
• It must not make arbitrary assumptions about the necessary conditions for intel-
ligent life.
As to the first point, we will see that the Bousso-Polchinski analysis is the first
plausible demonstration that the required dense set of metastable states might exist in
string theory, but it is certainly far from convincing. As to the second, we will, for most
of our discussion, adopt the viewpoint that the anthropic principle requires only that it
be possible for complex forms of life to develop. We will only briefly touch on scenarios
in which it might make sense to restrict one’s attention to carbon based life. Then, given
the current state of physics and biology, we claim that the second guideline rules out,
for the forseeable future, the possibility of an anthropic explanation of any parameter
besides the cosmological constant. The current state of biology is that we do not have
an explanation of our own carbon/oxygen based form of life. The best expert scientific
estimates of the probability for finding another intelligent species in our galaxy differ
among themselves by many orders of magnitude. The current state of physics is that we
do not have any fundamental explanation for what the low energy gauge group and its
matter representations are. A consistent anthropic argument for e.g. the fine structure
constant would have to show not only that the value of the fine structure constant was
necessary to the existence of a large number of intelligent civilizations composed of
carbon/oxygen people, but also that there were no other chemical compositions of life
or different low energy gauge theories whose life forms differed from our own by virtue of
having different low energy physics, which gave rise to comparable or larger numbers of
civilizations. Thus, an anthropic argument which explains the value of some parameter
makes sense if vacuum states with different values of this parameter suffer catastrophes
so universal and cataclysmic that we can be absolutely sure (on the basis of current
physics) that they can contain no intelligent life forms. The only parameters for which
this seems conceivable are the cosmological constant, and (perhaps) the dimension
of spacetime. They affect the universal dynamics of gravity and may thus lead to
highly generic phenomena. We emphasize that within particular scenarios in particular
vacuum states one may find that other parameters can affect the history of the universe
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in what appear to be catastrophic ways. For example, in states whose physics is close
to what we observe, various parameters may affect the baryon asymmetry by many
orders of magnitude. However, choosing the value of such a parameter anthropically
would violate our principles unless we could show conclusively that no other states of
the theory exist which have radically different low energy physics, but a reasonable
probability of having some form of life.3
Our first guideline forces us to work within the context of a real theory with many
ground states. The only candidate we have for such a theory at present is M-theory, and
the candidate ground states in this theory include some with low energy physics wildly
different from the Standard Model. Once we have accepted the anthropic principle
we must, within M-theory, show not only that the most probable ground states with
life resembling our own must have a certain parameter tuned to get the right baryon
asymmetry, but also that this vacuum does not have a much lower probability for
producing life forms than any other M-theory vacuum (or that it is dynamically chosen
by minimizing the potential). Again, this is a task far beyond our current abilities.
The only acceptable context for an anthropic determination of the sort of parameter
under discussion, would be a theory with a large number of ground states which all had
standard model low energy physics and differed only in the value of certain parameters.
Prior to the work of BP, we would have found this possibility totally implausible. In
the context of the BP approach, the question of whether there are many vacua with
standard model low energy physics depends on how the moduli are affected by the
fluxes.
In a geometrical picture, nonabelian gauge groups arise from singularities on moduli
space. If the moduli which control the singularity have nothing to do with the cycles
which bear the BP fluxes then it is perhaps plausible that we could have the same
low energy gauge groups for many BP vacua. The parameters in the low energy gauge
theory would be vacuum dependent4. In this context, we might imagine determining
some other parameters anthropically. For example, it is plausible (though certainly not
proven) that, within the standard model, the existence of life depends on the existence
of a baryon asymmetry. Given a unique and verified theory of how the asymmetry is
generated (which we do not yet have, and which probably depends on the existence
of degrees of freedom outside the standard model) one could then get an anthropic
3We emphasize that it is conceivable that with a more sophisticated understanding of physics and
biology than we possess today, we might eventually find that the explanation of the value of some of
the constants of nature would depend on the details of e.g., carbon based chemistry. However, for the
forseeable future, this is not likely to be a question we can address scientifically.
4In the large dimension scenario discussed below, it is possible that the low energy parameters
depend only weakly on the fluxes.
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constraint on the standard model parameters by insisting that a baryon asymmetry of
some reasonable size was generated. This is likely to constrain the parameters to lie
within a (not terribly small) distance from a submanifold of low codimension.
Although we have now identified a set of hypotheses under which anthropic de-
termination of some other parameters would be valid, the price to be paid is high:
in such a model, none of the parameters of low energy physics is determined by any-
thing other than these very weak anthropic constraints. An honest evaluation of such a
model would require us to determine the properties of all the vacuum states within the
anthropic range and see whether the values of parameters which fit our observations
are not highly improbable members of the distribution. If they are, one would have a
fine tuning problem. There are many parameters in the standard model (masses and
mixings of fermions in the heavier generations) which appear somewhat fine tuned but
are unlikely to significantly affect the question of whether there is a baryon asymmetry,
so it seems likely to us that even with the hypothesis that all BP vacua within the
anthropic range of the cosmological constant have standard model physics with vary-
ing parameters one is unlikely to get a satisfactory anthropic explanation of the world.
This is disturbing, because we will find that there are typically many BP vacua which
satisfy the anthropic bound on Λ, so that this sort of model forces one to find anthropic
explanations for the other constants of nature.
There is a second approach to the sort of anthropic argument described by BP,
whose existence we feel we must acknowledge. One can imagine a vast multiverse in
which all of the metastable vacua are realized at different “places”. Then the much
more restrictive anthropic arguments based on our own biochemistry could be used to
explain why we were in a particular place. One would need only to show the existence
of vacuum states with low energy parameters in the right range and would not have to
take into account questions of how typical these were among all vacuum states which
could support some kind of life.
It seems to us that this scenario amounts to abandoning the basic goal of funda-
mental physics, which is to find the principles which regulate the behavior of the world
we observe. That quest, in the kind of theory envisaged in the previous paragraph,
would stop at the standard model. All further explanation of the world we see would
have a contingent nature, like the explanations of history and geography. The fun-
damental theory of physics would mostly be about things we can never in principle
observe. In addition to our evident distaste for such a state of affairs, we have serious
doubts about whether it is compatible with the holographic ideas which seem to play
a central role in M-theory. The different “places in the multiverse” are outside each
other’s event horizons and we are ascribing independent degrees of freedom to each of
them. Though we cannot rule it out at present, we suspect that such a scenario is
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incompatible with the holographic principle.
One other disturbing feature of such a picture should be noted. In such a model,
all of the constants of nature relevant to low energy physics are random variables of this
sort. As we have remarked above, it seems highly unlikely that they are all fixed by
anthropic considerations. Thus, for example, one might imagine that the mass of the
u quark or the value of the fine structure constant is fixed by anthropic reasoning, but
it seems unlikely that, say, all of the values of neutrino masses, or all of the elements
of the KM matrix and the heavier quark masses, can be fixed in this way. Thus, even
the strong anthropic principle implied by the multiverse picture will, in the end, leave
us with fine tuning puzzles that cannot be resolved.
To our knowledge, the first attempt to make an anthropic determination of the cos-
mological constant incorporating our first guideline was [13]-[14]. This model combined
a scalar field called a relaxon with an extremely flat potential (which could be justi-
fied using a variety of symmetries) with a (then) conventional tunneling inflaton field.
The inflaton was supposed to tunnel out of a false DeSitter vacuum and reheat single
bubbles. As a consequence of the exponential expansion, the bubbles never coalesced
and each was a potential universe. This process continued eternally. The low energy
cosmological constant in each bubble was determined by the position of the relaxon
field at the time the bubble was nucleated. This gave rise to an ensemble of universes
with various values of the cosmological constant. It was conjectured that only those
with a cosmological constant within a few orders of magnitude of what was then the
observational upper bound would be able to support life. This would have been an
adequate explanation of the observations if the distribution for Λ had been flat. But
in fact, according to the logic of the model, the number of possible universes grows
exponentially with time, as Λ decreases and so there is a prediction that Λ take on
the largest possible negative value compatible with the existence of life. It was later
argued [4] that this might actually be zero within the observational errors. However,
today the model is surely ruled out.
Abbott [10] attempted to rescue this model by adding a rapidly oscillating potential
for the scalar field, which had many minima and in particular, one near the origin. The
universe was then argued to sequentially tunnel, rather than slowly roll, down to the
last positive minimum. This minimum is stable because of the Coleman-DeLuccia sup-
pression of tunneling into Anti DeSitter spaces. The problem is that in the penultimate
metastable state, the universe inflates away all of its energy density and finds itself in a
state with very small positive cosmological constant, but no matter or radiation. This
is the empty universe problem.
Weinberg attempted to constrain models of this type by doing the first honest
calculation of the anthropic bound on the cosmological constant. He pointed out that
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once galaxies form, there can be no further bound. Given a single galaxy one will
inevitably have stars and planets, and physics inside this gravitationally bound system
will be insensitive to the exponential expansion of the universe on time scales much
longer than the age of our universe. Weinberg’s original estimate was a bound of
102 − 103 times the critical density. Recent work has attempted to argue that the
typical value of the cosmological constant in an ensemble satisfying Weinberg’s bound
is actually of order the critical density [5]. The arguments which go into this bound
depend only on the physics of gravity and the equations of state of matter and radiation.
Thus, it has the insensitivity to our ignorance required by our second guideline5. In
the next section we will see whether the models of Bousso and Polchinski are similarly
insensitive.
3. Flux redux
The work of BT was based on the observation that screening of 4-form flux by membrane
antimembrane creation provided a mechanism for dynamically changing the cosmolog-
ical constant in a four dimensional universe. This is a precise analog of screening of
electric fields by charged particle creation in the Schwinger model. BP generalize this
idea by observing that M-theory compactifications on a 7-manifold with many 3-cycles
(we will generally think of a Calabi-Yau 3-fold fibered over a circle or an interval), will
have many four-form fluxes in the four dimensional effective field theory. The corre-
sponding membranes are the original membrane of M-theory and five-branes wrapped
around the three-cycles. If there are N such fluxes, the low energy effective energy has
an energy density, in the case of a torus
M6
M2P
N∑
1
q2i n
2
i − Λb (3.1)
where q2i (in a slight change of notation from BP) is the volume of the i-th 3-cycle in fun-
damental units (ViM
3) and Λb a bare cosmological constant independent of the fluxes.
MP is the four-dimensional Planck mass, given by the equation M
2
P = M
2(M7V7). In
the simplest scenario. While this equation looks rather general, this is deceptive. It
is valid for the seven torus, but not for manifolds in which some cycles can shrink to
5Weinberg’s bound does implicitly assume that galaxies are necessary for life. The eminent as-
tronomer F. Hoyle once suggested [15] (albeit in a work of speculative fiction) that the typical lifeforms
in the universe were vast interstellar gas clouds who were very surprised to find that life could exist on
planets. It is clear to us neither that Weinberg’s bound would apply in such a hypothetical situation,
nor that we know enough about complex systems to rule out Hoyle’s Conjecture. Such are the travails
of anyone foolish enough to think seriously about the anthropic principle.
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zero at fixed volume, with the volume of Poincare´ dual cycles also fixed. BP argue
that if the qi are incommensurable, and if either the unit of energy density involved in
the change of a single flux is small compared to Λb or the number of fluxes is large,
then there will always be points in the discretuum of allowed values of ni, for which the
cosmological constant is consistent with observation. These vacua are then chosen by
the anthropic principle.
There are a large number of assumptions involved in writing the energy equation
in the simple form above (most of these are mentioned by BP). First and foremost,
we are using low energy effective field theory. Thus, all energy densities should be
much smaller than the fundamental scale, and fluxes should not be so large that higher
order terms in the effective action are important. As an example of what is involved,
note that in 11D SUGRA, the BP fluxes give tree level masses to many components
of the gravitino. The one loop Coleman-Weinberg formula for the dependence of the
vacuum energy density on the fluxes contains terms quartic in the flux. Thus to trust
the BP analysis one must be in a regime where these and other terms are negligible.
BP achieve this by insisting that some of the internal dimensions are larger than the
fundamental scale. We can distinguish two cases: the dimensions are slightly larger
than the fundamental scale, or they are much larger.
Consider, first, the case that they are slightly larger. Note that low energy super-
symmetry, in the conventional sense, is not likely to be relevant in this case, since the
energy associated with the fluxes will be far larger than the would-be scale of super-
symmetry breaking, and the fluxes themselves break SUSY. If the dimensions are only
slightly larger (up to a few orders of magnitude), then the parameters of the standard
model, such as the Higgs mass and the value of the QCD scale, as well as gauge and
Yukawa couplings, will be sensitive to the values of the fluxes. Moreover, there is likely
to be a huge number of states which satisfy the anthropic bound on the cosmological
constant. For example, if there are, as in the discussion of BP, of order 120 fluxes, than
changing the values of the charges (qi) by a factor of 2 changes the number of acceptable
states by a factor of order 1060. So all of the parameters of the standard model—and in
particular the gauge hierarchy—will be, unpredictable, simply determined by anthropic
considerations. The Higgs mass, for example, will receive contributions from couplings
to the four-form flux, such as
∫
ddyd4x
√
gF 2MNOP |φ|2 (3.2)
Corrections to the gauge couplings, from operators such as F 2MNOPF
2
µν , will be nomi-
nally of order one (
∫
ddy
√
gF 2MNOP is, by assumption, of order the fundamental scale);
similar remarks apply to the Yukawa couplings.
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This violates the principles we laid out earlier. Note also that one is also making the
assumption, here, that any moduli of the compactification (e.g. those associated with
the relatively large size of the compact dimensions) have stable minima for all values
of the fluxes. This seems a quite strong assumption, given that the flux contributions
to the potential are not likely to be much smaller than other contributions.
We have spoken of the Higgs particle, in this small extra dimension case, but
one could also imagine that technicolor plays some role. However, in the anthropic
context, technicolor scenarios are highly suspect, if not ruled out altogether. Even the
most ardent enthusiast would admit that the generic technicolor model is inconsistent
with experiment. To promote an anthropic technicolor scenario consistent with our
rules, advocates would have to show that these models not only arose among those BP
vacua with reasonable values of the cosmological constant, but also that technicolor
models consistent with experiment were generic in these vacua. Otherwise, and this
is the most likely conclusion, the BP prediction for a universe with relatively small
internal dimensions is that the universe does not contain a spontaneously broken gauge
symmetry at the electroweak scale, or at best that it does contain one but that the
model is inconsistent with observation.
The alternative, is to consider the possibility that some dimensions are very large,
as in the large dimension proposal of [8]. In this case, the assumption that the values of
the moduli are independent of the fluxes is almost certainly not correct, and it is most
natural to imagine that the fluxes play a role in fixing the moduli. We will first assume
that there are d ≥ 3 dimensions with RM ≫ 1 and, for the moment, that the cycles
which define the fluxes have linear scale of order R. Most other assumptions about the
number of large dimensions and the flux bearing cycles lead to similar conclusions. We
will explore some possible exceptional cases individually below. We further assume that
the standard model lives on a brane, that the bulk is supersymmetric and that SUSY
breaking comes from a brane, not necessarily the standard model brane. In particular,
the leading order in RM bulk geometry will be assumed Ricci-flat.
Contributions to the four-dimensional cosmological constant can now be classified
by their dependence on RM . A brane cosmological constant is of order one. A bulk
curvature squared term is of order (RM)(d−4) and there are various bulk contributions
to the energy which scale like (RM)(d−6). The flux terms scale like (RM)(d−6). They
are thus subdominant at large RM but we can make them arbitrarily large and positive
by increasing the value of the quantized flux (though we should stop before violating
the rules of effective field theory). Finally, we can imagine some independent flux
which (perhaps unrealistically) we assume cannot be changed by dynamical tunneling
processes. This will give a positive term in the energy, with a coefficient that we can
allow to be large. We will call it the flux ex machina.
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Assume first that d > 4. Then the energy is dominated by the curvature squared
term, a(RM)(d−4). In order for the potential to be bounded below at large RM , a
must be positive6. The radius can be stabilized at a large value by balancing the
contribution of a large BP flux against this curvature squared term. However, both
terms give positive contributions to the cosmological constant and the BP cancellation
is not operative. The situation is not improved by introducing the flux ex machina
since it too gives a positive contribution to the cosmological constant. Note that it
does not make sense to stabilize the radius by balancing the positive curvature squared
term against, e.g. a curvature cubed term. These can balance at large RM only if
we fine tune dimensionless coefficients. One would have to find a theory which had
a variety of vacuum states for each value of the BP flux, in which the short distance
physics induced many different values for the coefficients in the effective Lagrangian,
including finely tuned ones, in order to find an anthropic explanation of this tuning.
We thus assume d ≤ 4, in which case the brane cosmological constant dominates
the energy density in the absence of large fluxes. This can be assumed negative. The
BP flux term must be of the same order of magnitude as this term at the anthropic value
of the BP fluxes. Since this term depends on R, it must be one of the important terms
in the radial stabilization equation. For the same reason, it is also much larger than the
curvature cubed term (which scales the same way as a function of RM). For four large
dimensions this means that we must rely on a flux ex machina whose contribution to
the energy grows like (RM)p with p > 0 in order to stabilize the radius. But there are
no such fluxes in four dimensions, so we conclude that while the BP mechanism can
work, the radius cannot be stabilized at a large value and the model is inconsistent. If
there are three large dimensions, we can stabilize the radius by balancing the curvature
squared term against the BP flux7. The required coefficient of the curvature squared
term is however negative (since both terms decrease with RM) and we are again stuck
with a metastable minimum for the radius.
We now relax our assumptions and turn to the case of two large dimensions. The
seven-form flux of M-theory is integrated over one small and two large dimensions in
order to get the BP fluxes in the noncompact dimensions. The energy of a BP flux now
scales like (RM)(−2). The dominant term in the energy is no longer the brane cosmo-
logical constant, but a term scaling like a ln(RM) coming from the infrared behavior
6We note that a metastable minimum for RM would be incompatible with the BP idea. In the
BP scenario the universe is imagined to tunnel around the flux lattice many times before finding the
anthropic vacuum with small cosmological constant. No metastable vacuum for the moduli could have
a long enough lifetime to “wait for the BP process to be completed”.
7In order for this mechanism to work, the brane cosmological term must be of order 1/R. This can
be explained by SUSY if the SUSY breaking scale is no bigger than the flux terms.
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of two-dimensional massless propagators. We will however include the brane cosmo-
logical constant as well because logarithms are not that large even when RM ∼ 1015.
Stabilization now requires
∑
n2i ∼ a(RM)2 and that the coefficient of the logarithm is
positive. The requirement that the cosmological constant cancel is now ln(
∑
n2i ) ∼ Λb.
The bare cosmological constant must of course be negative.
In order to solve the gauge hierarchy problem, we follow [8] and ask that M ∼ 1
TeV, which,8 given MP ∼ 2× 1018 GeV, means RM ∼ 1015. This requires Λb to be an
order of magnitude or two higher than we might have expected it to be but still much
smaller that one would have obtained in a similar theory with no bulk SUSY. We can
also estimate the contributions to the vacuum energy due to loops of particles which
obtain SUSY violating masses from the BP fluxes. These are smaller than or equal to
the flux energies themselves, so the model appears self consistent.
There are several attractive features of this model. The BP mechanism gives a
rationale for the stabilization by large flux postulated in [16]. Using anthropic logic,
the large flux vacua are the only ones we are likely to see. The two ideas interact
synergistically, for the large flux also facilitates the cancellation of the cosmological
constant. In this picture, the parameters of the SM are not very sensitive to the values
of the fluxes, since the fluxes are of order 1/
√
V . Finally, the problem of the small
radius picture, that there are likely to be vast numbers of states with suitable values
of the cosmological constant, is significantly ameliorated here. If the volume is large,
only a small number of fluxes are required in order to implement the BP cancellation
of the cosmological term. So rather than, say, 1060 states, one might easily imagine
that there are only 100’s or 1000’s of states compatible with the bound.
4. Brane-antibrane separation
We would like to present another scenario realizing the basic philosophy proposed by
BP. We will also generate a large number of metastable states among which we find
some vacua with a small value of the cosmological constant, but the way we obtain the
large number of metastable states will be different.
Let us imagine a compact space (e.g. a Calabi-Yau space) with a p-cycle of a small
volume (imagine S3 which shrinks to zero at the conifold point of the moduli space). Let
us furthermore assume that there are two different places where this p-cycle shrinks to a
small size: we therefore deal with submanifolds X, Y which are topologically equivalent.
Now we can wrap N (p+3)-branes on X and N (p+3)-antibranes on Y . Those branes
8Of course the phenomenological constraints on models with two large dimensions tell us that M
must be greater than about 50 TeV. One must presume that this is still consistent with solving the
hierarchy problem.
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and antibranes are extended in the large dimensions, all the transverse dimensions are
compact and therefore the total brane charge must vanish. There can be several pairs
of cycles Xi, Yi, i = 1, . . . ncycles in the same way as BP use many different types of
fluxes. The number Ni of the branes wrapped on Xi plays the role of the flux in the
BP picture. An easy toy model for visualizing this configuration is a torus T 2 whose
a cycle shrinks to zero at two opposite points along the b cycle. We see that although
conservation of the charge does not prevent the branes from annihilating, there is an
energy barrier that makes such an event unlikely. The brane (or antibrane) must move
through the “thick” region where its tension is necessarily large.
Otherwise the physics is similar to that of the picture of BP. There is a negative
“bare” cosmological constant which is compensated by a large number of branes and
antibranes wrapped on the shrunk cycles Xi, Yi, each of which contributes a positive
amount to the vacuum energy. Sometimes—after a cosmologically long period of time—
a brane tunnels through the “thick” region of the Calabi-Yau space and annihilates with
its antipartner, reducing the number Ni by one. The relevant instanton consists of a
bubble in three space in which the compact dimensions of the branes and antibranes
move together and annihilate. If there are enough types of six-brane, and/or if the
energy densities associated with them are sufficiently small, it is possible to cancel off
the negative cosmological constant to the desired degree of accuracy.
There are several reasons why we consider this picture to be more flexible than
the picture of BP. First of all, the tensions of the wrapped branes can contribute small
amounts to the 4-dimensional effective vacuum energy The natural small number can
be obtained from the size of the shrunk cycle. Furthermore in the previous sections we
showed that it is hard to ensure both stabilization of the moduli and the cancellation
of the vacuum energy in the BP picture.
In the case of the wrapped branes, the contribution to the vacuum energy from
the wrapped branes depends mostly on the geometry near Xi, Yi and not much on the
overall size of the manifold. Therefore we effectively decouple the problems of the stabi-
lization and the vacuum energy: the branes onXi, Yi are responsible for the cancellation
of the cosmological constant, while a different dynamics solves the stabilization of the
overall size of the manifold.
As far as stabilizing the moduli of the shrinking cycle is concerned, it appears
sufficient to put a three-form flux onto the shrinking cycles on which the branes are
wrapped. The size of the cycle is then determined by the ratio of this flux and the
6-brane charge, and is naturally small if the ratio is small. Of course, this discussion
is too glib. We are trying to discuss nonsupersymmetric compactifications of 11D
SUGRA on a complicated manifold with fluxes and branes, and the real dynamics is
highly nontrivial. Our discussion here is merely suggestive of the existence of a stable
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solution. One point in favor of this view is that by making the manifold large, we
can control the scale of SUSY breaking and study configurations that are close to
supersymmetric ones.
This might also have phenomological implications. If the manifold is large, and
the standard model lives in the bulk, far from the small cycles, SUSY breaking in the
standard model will be suppressed. Thus, this kind of model can support hidden sector
SUSY breaking, perhaps with the conventional intermediate scale.
5. Rationalizing the Irrational Axion
Some time ago, Seiberg and two of the present authors described another class of
models with a discretuum of vacua [9]. Although the main thrust of that paper was
an explanation of the strong CP problem, it was noted that the same model also
might provide an anthropic resolution of the cosmological constant problem. We would
now like to present an updated version of that model which is at least superficially
compatible with M-theory.
It is well known that the F-theory region of M-theory moduli space [17, 18, 19] can
give rise to vacua with a direct product gauge group with large numbers of relatively
large factors. Let us assume such a compactification, with 4 conserved supercharges
(up to low energy gauge theory effects, which will break SUSY) and a product G ⊗
G1 . . . ⊗ GN . G will be asymptotically free and have SUSY breaking dynamics at
a scale MSUSY . The Gi are taken to be SU(Ni) groups with a sufficient number of
matter fields to make them infrared stable at the fundamental scale. However, we
imagine that their β functions are relatively small because e.g. the number of flavors
of fundamental chiral fields is near the critical value. Furthermore, we imagine that
there are low energy couplings between the fields in G and those in the Gi. That is, we
have low energy SUSY breaking in the Gi rather than gravity mediated effects. The
SUSY breaking removes some Gi matter fields, making the infrared running of the Gi
couplings unstable. Since the Ni are large, all of the Gi gauge couplings will become
strong at scales not too far belowMSUSY . We will approximate this situation by saying
that all the scales are approximately the same, and call the single scale m.
Finally, we imagine that all but one of the moduli of the theory have been frozen,
either by a high energy SUSY and R preserving superpotential, or by the effects of SUSY
breaking. The single axion field is a periodic field which originates as a component of
some higher dimensional p-form gauge field. If a is the canonically normalized four-
dimensional axion, then a/fa is a periodic variable with period 2pi, and this defines the
axion decay constant fa. a has couplings to the gauge fields of the form (a/fa)
∑
Qi,
where Qi the topological charge density of the gauge group Gi. Instanton effects in the
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gauge groups will give rise to an axion potential with period 2pi. However, if the process
of SUSY breaking leaves some unbroken chiral symmetries, and a corresponding set of
massless nonsinglet fermions, then spontaneous breaking of these symmetries will give
us a discretuum of vacua. For simplicity, suppose that all fermions besides the gauginos
are lifted by SUSY breaking. Then each SU(Ni) gauge theory will have Ni vacua due
to gaugino condensation.
The potential generated for the axion by Gi now has periodicity 2pi/Ni, so we
obtain a formula for the total potential
V =
∑
i
eiM
4Pi(a/faNi) (5.1)
where the Pi have period 2pi and the ei are numbers of order one. If the Ni are relatively
prime, this function will have
∏
Ni minima. If
∏
Ni ∼ (M4/Λ) then there will typically
be at least one minimum with V ∼ Λ. Thus, again we have a discretuum with at least
one vacuum which satisfies the observational constraints on the cosmological constant.
We have neglected the contribution to the cosmological constant from the SUSY
breaking dynamics itself. We can take this into account by including the coupling
of the axion to G. If the G theory has only a few vacua it will generate a potential
of the form M4SUSY PG(a/fa) where PG has a short period (a few times 2pi). Thus,
it will have many zeroes within the period of the potential (5.1). In regions of size
∆a/fa ∼ (M/MSUSY )4 around these zeroes the problem reduces to the one we solved
previously, so if
∏
Ni ∼ (M4SUSY /Λ) there will be a minimum with a cosmological
constant of order Λ.
6. The empty universe problem and the cosmic microwaveback-
ground (CMB)
Anthropic models of the cosmological constant often suffer from the empty universe
problem [10] [2]. That is, while they explain why there is a vacuum state with small
cosmological constant, their mode of accessing that vacuum leaves them with no mech-
anism for generating the entropy of the cosmos. In broad terms, the problem is that if
one achieves the anthropic vacuum by tunneling from a metastable state with positive
cosmological constant, one appears to tunnel into an empty vacuum. The model of
[13]-[14] shows that this is not an inevitable consequence of anthropic ideas.
BP present three different suggestions for solving the empty universe problem.
The first exploits the Hawking temperature of the penultimate metastable DeSitter
vacuum to ensure that an inflaton tunnels to a nonvacuum value. This mechanism is
unlikely to work in a model in which the gaps in the discretuum are small compared
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to the Planck scale. We have seen that the latter condition is necessary to a solution
of the hierarchy problem. The second suggestion uses properties of a particular class
of inflaton potentials. The third (which BP attribute to suggestions of Susskind and
Thomas) is, we believe, much more generic. It is simply to recognize that in a model
containing a discretuum, {n} and an inflaton field φ, the effective potential V (φ, {n})
is not apt to be a simple sum of a discretuum potential and an inflaton potential. That
is, the inflaton potential will depend on which point in the discretuum one is working
at. This is essentially the same point that we have made about the {n} dependence of
the potential for moduli.
It is important that the flatness of the inflaton potential be generic and independent
of the discretuum. This is easily achieved if the inflaton is itself a modulus [20]9. In
such a model the tunneling process from the penultimate point in the discretuum to
the anthropic vacuum will place the inflaton at some point on the equipotential surface
whose energy (including derivative contributions) is equal to that of the false vacuum.
The particular point on this surface is determined by minimizing the action of the
relevant instanton. This point is in the basin of attraction of the anthropic vacuum
but definitely not at it, and in models where the potential is a generic function of
discretuum and inflaton there is no reason why we cannot have inflation and reheating.
The real problem is in the details. Models which solve the hierarchy problem have a
low value for the gap in the discretuum. In the axion and wrapped brane models we can
tolerate a vacuum energy scale of 1010.5 GeV if SUSY breaking is communicated to the
standard model via gravitational effects. In the BP model with two large dimensions
and a fundamental scale of a TeV, the vacuum energy scale is 1 TeV. Given a modular
inflation model, the generic prediction for the amplitude of CMB fluctuations in such
models will be too small to be compatible with observations.
There is a sense in which this problem is more severe than the empty universe
problem we claim to have averted. As far as we can see, models of the type we are
discussing could easily produce situations in which we would be unable to rule out the
possibility of intelligent life. That is, for a broad range of choices of both discrete (gauge
groups) and continuous parameters in our models, we would find a matter dominated
era of the universe in which galaxies could form and there was a rich and complex low
energy physics. Nonetheless, the generic prediction would be that the amplitude of
primordial CMB fluctuations was incompatible with observations in our universe. We
would conclude that within our class of models, a universe that resembled our own was
very improbable, among all those which might have life in them.
9Modular inflation models still require two or three orders of magnitude of fine tuning, which is
much less than most alternatives. Some ideas for explaining this tuning can be found in [21].
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We would like to acknowledge that many inflation theorists would consider our
argument to be a defect of modular inflation models but not of the general anthropic
ideas we are exploring here. There are inflationary models with a low vacuum energy
scale and adequate amplitudes for density fluctuations. Few of these models satisfy
the usual field theoretic criterion of naturalness. They contain small dimensionless
parameters whose size is not explained by any symmetries. As in our discussion of
technicolor above, we consider this a more serious defect in the anthropic context than
otherwise. If one is writing down a phenomenological approximation to a unique theory
of the universe, one may hope that violations of naturalness will eventually be explained
by explicit calculations in the theory of everything. In the anthropic context, one must
view all parameters as being drawn from an ensemble consistent with the very weak
anthropic constraint. Violations of naturalness would seem to occur with very low
probability.
7. Anthropic vacuum selection in M-theory
So far, we have considered a variety of anthropic proposals for understanding the cos-
mological constant, and possibly other parameters in the low energy effective action.
These suggestions have in common the idea that there are a vast array of stable or
metastable ground states of string theory with rather generic properties. We have
found all of these ideas troubling in some respect. Not least of all, it is not clear that
such a discretuum exists in string theory. In the case where the charges are large, one
would require, for example, that there be a stable minimum of the moduli potential
for every value of the fluxes. Yet changes in the fluxes are not extremely small pertur-
bations in the theory, and it is not clear whether such a set of stable solutions would
exist. Indeed, our experience in M-theory is that it is very hard to stabilize the moduli
once SUSY is broken. In the case of large dimensions, we saw that only for the case of
two large compact dimensions is it possible to cancel the cosmological constant without
fine tuning. Whether or not there exists a discretuum of solutions depends on detailed
properties of the theory, which we are not in a position to explore at the present time.
In this section, we propose an alternative viewpoint. Rather than arguing that there
are innumerable string vacua with properties almost compatible with the existence of
life, we would like to consider what we view as a far more reasonable possibility: generic
string vacua are incompatible with the formation of structure in the universe. This,
we would suggest, might be the solution of the vacuum degeneracy problem of string
theory—provided that there are at least a small number of vacua compatible with the
very weak anthropic principle we have advanced in section 2.
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To understand this point, let us divide the known ground states of string theory
into categories:
• Supersymmetric vacua in dimension d ≥ 5, or supersymmetric vacua in dimension
d = 4 with more than eight supersymmetries.
• Supersymmetric vacua in dimension d = 4 with four or eight supersymmetries
and exact moduli (as well as some approximate moduli).
• Four-dimensional vacua with SUSY restored only in extreme regions of moduli
space where gravity decouples.
• Vacua in d = 4 without supersymmetry anywhere in the moduli space—i.e. with
Planck scale SUSY breaking. Note that most of the hypothetical BP vacua fall
into this category.
• Theories in d < 4 with or without supersymmetry.
Our goal will not be to prove that any of these possibilities is incompatible with the
development of a large universe with structure on interesting scales, but rather to argue
that it is plausible that generic vacua in each of these classes are incompatible with the
very weak version of the anthropic principle we have proposed. This is, in our view, the
most reasonable possibility, compatible with our present understanding of M-theory, for
understanding the problem of vacuum selection. The reasons our arguments must be
very tentative are easy to understand. First, if we give up the anthropic explanation of
the cosmological constant, we don’t know how (or whether) the cosmological constant
problem is solved in string theory. We might imagine a gamut of possibilities: that
it is only solved in states with some degree of (approximate) supersymmetry, that it
is always solved, or that it is never solved. Second, we have no understanding of the
degree to which inflation is generic in string theory. Our working assumption is that
it is reasonably generic, i.e. that it happens in some finite (if small) fraction of string
ground states. For example, if the scale of some modulus potential is lower than the
string scale, and if the modulus varies on a scale of order Mp, then the number of
e-foldings is of order one; presumably if it is of order 20− 30, one has the possibility of
structure formation.
With the understanding that our goal is only to provide suggestive, rather than
definitive, arguments, let us consider the various cases in turn.
• Theories in d > 4, with some degree of supersymmetry, or in 4 dimensions with
more than 8 supercharges: In all of these theories, there are exact moduli spaces.
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The dynamics on the moduli space is highly constrained. Suppose that the uni-
verse was at some time hot, and reasonably large. Subsequently, the energy
density in the zero modes of the moduli redshifts much more rapidly than T d.
Furthermore, there is an instability [20] which converts modular zero mode en-
ergy rapidly into radiation. There are stable massive objects in these models, but
they are BPS and in generic regions of M-theory moduli space have mass of order
the Planck scale. The only conserved quantum numbers they carry are coupled
to long range fields and there cannot be an excess of particles over antiparticles.
There are no known metastable neutral particles.
There is no mechanism for producing these particles in the regime where the
temperature is well below the Planck mass and semiclassical cosmology makes
sense. Thus, their initial density is an input. However, we can conclude that
structure formation is unlikely for any initial density. Would be structures are
composed of equal mixtures of particles and antiparticles and rapidly annihilate
into radiation. It seems that generic models of this type are radiation dominated
throughout all of cosmic history, and no structures are formed.
We realize that there are loopholes in these arguments, but suggest that it is
likely that they can be closed as our understanding of these states improves.
• Theories in d = 4 with approximate N = 1 supersymmetry in extreme regions of
the moduli space: It is well known that these theories tend to exhibit runaway
behavior towards supersymmetric regions of moduli space. No example is known
where one can show, reliably, that there is a stable local minimum of the potential
in the interior of the moduli space. While in general we do not expect metastable
minima in the interior of the moduli space, it is plausible that there are reasonably
stable minima in some cases. The question would be how frequently such minima
appear. Roughly speaking, we might imagine local minima are metastable when,
for example, there is a low energy theory with moderately small gauge couplings.
We do not know how to assess this possibility, since we have no examples. It is
possible that they are rare. Racetrack models have been proposed as a mechanism
to stabilize some moduli [21]. These models involve discrete fine tunings of gauge
groups and particle content, and so, by definition, if they occur at all they are
rare. We will assume that this is the case; generic string states with asymptotic
N = 1 SUSY exhibit only cosmological solutions. Can these be compatible with
the formation of structure? Quite generally, for the superpotentials which give
rise to runaway behavior, the potential is related to the scale of supersymmetry
breaking. Generally for these potentials the potential energy drops more rapidly
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than 1/R4, and the temperature always dominates the energy [20].
• Theories where SUSY is broken at the Planck scale and there is no runaway
to a supersymmetric region. All examples of this type have negative potentials
which draw the system towards apparently catastrophic regions in the interior of
moduli space. Since reliable approximations break down before the catastrophe
is achieved, we cannot say for certain that these models have no sensible large
scale physics, but it appears highly unlikely. Note that once one puts moduli into
the picture, the BP vacua are in this category. In the bulk of the text we have
imagined, with BP, the possibility that most of the moduli are stabilized by some
higher energy dynamics. Here we opine that this is unlikely, and that the BP
vacua are not really stable.
• Theories in d < 4: Here the bizarre nature of long range gravitational interactions
makes it unlikely that structure will form. There is no Newtonian gravitational
potential, no Jeans instability, and no reason to expect galaxies.
• The most likely candidate vacua in which there might be structure formation
but obvious disagreement with observation, are those with exact N = 1, 2 super-
symmetric moduli spaces in d = 4. (N = 1 theories with exact moduli spaces
were discussed in [22].) These vacua can have weakly coupled gauge theories
in them which generate a variety of scales well below the Planck scale. As a
consequence, it is possible to have approximately conserved quantum numbers
like baryon number or exact discrete symmetries which guarantee the existence
of long lived massive particles (this was not the case in the examples described
in [22], however). Given this possibility, depending on initial conditions and
the details of the dynamics, one may develop an asymmetry in the approximate
quantum number. Stable structures can now develop via gravitational clumping.
Note that the cosmological constant vanishes in such scenarios, so something like
galaxy formation may very well occur. For the N = 2 case, the region of moduli
space where there is strong IR dynamics at scales well below the Planck scale is
very tiny, and one may argue that these vacua require fine tuning. However, for
N = 1 there may be codimension zero moduli spaces with unbroken nonabelian
groups. The real question with regard to these vacua is how likely it is that one
has weakly coupled gauge theories. This is a question that we do not yet know
how to answer. One possibility for N = 1 is that the gauge couplings depend
on the exact moduli. If the universe is closed, the exact moduli will be time
dependent early in cosmological history, but will come to a halt at some point in
moduli space. The question of whether gauge couplings are weak would depend
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on the initial conditions. Thus, the search for an anthropic vacuum selection
principle might fail because of our inability to rule out vacua in this category.
While it is possible that SUSY is incompatible with life, it seems possible that it
is compatible with structure formation.
Our proposed anthropic vacuum selection principle can rule out large classes of
string vacua, but vacua with exact N = 1 SUSY resemble the real world a little too
closely to be eliminated by the very weak form of the anthropic argument that we
have advocated. We have however assumed that reasonably weak gauge couplings are
easy to come by in M-theory. Perhaps this is not the case. One way of explaining the
weakness of gauge couplings utilizes the racetrack mechanism [21]. This requires an
intricate pattern of gauge groups and might be realized only rarely among solutions
of M-theory. Perhaps, for reasons we do not currently understand, it cannot occur
in vacua that are also supersymmetric. Or perhaps exact N = 1 moduli spaces with
metastable particles are, for some reason, very rare. Otherwise, one would have to
hope for a more detailed anthropic argument that could eliminate exact SUSY. At the
moment, we do not have one.
8. Conclusions
We have examined anthropic models which explain the value of the cosmological con-
stant in terms of tunneling between a large discrete set of metastable vacua. Within the
modern M-theoretic point of view, we emphasized the necessity of considering modular
stabilization in conjunction with minimization of the vacuum energy with respect to
discrete parameters. Examining the bare minimum in this regard, namely stabilization
of the overall breathing mode of the internal manifold, we found strong constraints on
such models. In particular, when we incorporate the further requirement of solving the
gauge hierarchy problem, we find that the only sensible models have a vacuum energy
scale bounded by about 1011 GeV. Such models generally lead to a prediction for the
amplitude of CMB fluctuations which is orders of magnitude too low.
We presented some ground rules for anthropic models which incorporate a decent
respect for our ignorance of the physical basis of intelligent life. These rules imply that
in our current state of knowledge, anthropic determination of parameters is acceptable
only if the physics involved in the argument is generic and model independent, and
if the disaster implied by values of the parameters outside their experimentally deter-
mined range was sufficiently terrible for us to conclude that no form of self-organized
behavior would be possible. In our view this argument virtually rules out anthropic
determination of parameters other than the cosmological constant and (perhaps) the
21
number of large spacetime dimensions. For example, we believe that strong anthropic
determination of the vacuum state in M-theory (we must have an SU(3, 2, 1) gauge
theory in order to have conventional chemistry and carbon based life, etc.) would not
be scientifically defensible.
We would also like to reiterate a remark about the anthropic models studied in
this paper which is perhaps the most disturbing criticism of this circle of ideas. Our
initial attitude towards anthropic arguments was that they might be reasonable when
restricted to the cosmological constant. However, the central point of models of the BP
type is that we can explain an extraordinarily small number in terms of a concatenation
of numbers of reasonable magnitude.
As we have seen, if the internal dimensions in the BP scenario are small, or if one
adopts the almost irrational axion models, one finds that there will be many metastable
vacua with cosmological constants within anthropic bounds. Insisting that there be
only one would be an artificial and arbitrary constraint on the model, with not even
anthropic justification. The set of vacua within the anthropic window for the cosmo-
logical constant will differ from each other in many ways. Thus, all of the details of low
energy physics (values of constants in the low energy Lagrangian and perhaps even its
field content) must be viewed as being chosen from an ensemble. These models thus
require anthropic arguments to explain not just the cosmological constant, but also the
other parameters of the low energy effective Lagrangian. If we are to declare such a
model an acceptable explanation of the physical world, we must decide between the
two philosophies we have sketched above.
According to the first we would have to show that the vacuum in which the details
fit experiment was typical among all those for which we could not rule out the possibility
of life. Thus, the work involved in verifying such a model of physics is multiplied many
times compared to our usual task of simply calculating all the numerical details of a
complicated dynamical system and comparing them with experiment. We must repeat
the calculation for all the other vacua (with no guide from experiment) and show that
our effective Lagrangian was typical. We are more likely to be able to show that it
is not, and to rule the model out. And even if we succeeded in this herculean task
we would be left with the conclusion that the detailed numerical values of low energy
parameters were a statistical accident with no hope of scientific explanation. It is a
very bleak picture of the future of physics.
The second philosophy declares that all vacua compatible with the weak anthropic
principle are actually realized, in a vast multiverse whose component universes can
never communicate with each other. We are just one of many forms of life in the
multiverse, and we can use the strong anthropic principle to explain why our particular
life form lives in the component of the multiverse where the parameters are just so.
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The fundamental theory has no more to say about all the low energy physics we will
ever observe than that it is a possible metastable state of the theory (very likely a very
special one). We leave further discussion of this philosophy to its proponents.
We have seen that in the case of two large dimensions, the situation is better. The
parameters of the SM are not so sensitive to the values of the fluxes, and, while the
number of vacua compatible with formation of structure is probably large, it need not
be enormous.
Thus, we believe that it may be possible to overcome the difficulties of the anthropic
models that have been discussed so far. Still, we are extremely skeptical of this mode of
explanation. This skepticism is scientifically based, but coincides (perhaps suspiciously)
with our emotional reaction to the notion of an anthropic resolution of the cosmological
constant problem. Puzzles like that of the magnitude of the cosmological constant
often lead to revolutionary conceptual changes in the structure of physics. There is
a wealth of vague and partial evidence that our notion of how M-theory reduces to
local field theory is flawed. This evidence relates to the holographic principle and the
idea that M-theory has many fewer degrees of freedom than field theory (exactly the
opposite of the naive counting). It is obvious that these ideas have a bearing on the
cosmological constant problem and it seems unlikely to us that the problem will be
solved by anthropic reasoning in a low energy effective field theory.
Finally, we have advocated the use of anthropic arguments in a rather different
context, that of vacuum selection in M-theory. We propose to eliminate dynamically
stable but phenomenologically repugnant vacua by showing that they cannot support
life. The aim is to use only Weinberg’s structure formation criterion in making the
decision about whether a given vacuum state is hostile to life. We found that a large
class of vacua might be eliminated by such arguments, but that the jury is still out on
vacua with exact N = 1 SUSY in four dimensions. The issue may hinge on questions
about the prevalence of weakly coupled gauge theories and stable particles. What
we view as exciting about this possibility is that these are questions which might be
amenable to resolution in the not too distant future.
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